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Politics for Angels 
 
 
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” 




 How many  idealizing assumptions may we make when doing political philosophy? May 
we assume our citizens more rational than they are, or our governments more efficient than in 
reality? These questions lie at the center of the debate between ideal and non-ideal theorists. Ideal 
theorists believe it permissible to engage in counterfactual assumptions about citizens and states 
when doing political philosophy, and non-ideal theorists think the opposite. In this paper, I will 
argue against a particular defense of ideal theory given by David Estlund, who argues that the low 
probability that a standard of justice will be met does not count against that standard’s plausibility. 
I will claim that we should reject this principle because if we do not, we will be committed to the 
view that no state is justified at all. 
 
Introduction 
 In this paper, I will try to give a principled philosophical defense of the common sentiment 
that political theorizing must account for the real imperfections of human beings and their 
institutions. Since the publication of John Rawls’ seminal A Theory of Justice in 1971, the debate 
over the extent to which political philosophers should abstract from the real world has intensified. 
Whether we choose to abstract or not bears heavily on our answers to the most fundamental 
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questions of political philosophy. The two sides of the divide will give distinct answers to 
questions of political legitimacy, the just distribution of resources, and the duties of citizens. 
 I will begin with an examination of a paradigmatic defense of abstraction provided by the 
philosopher David Estlund. David Estlund is among the most prominent defenders of the view that 
when formulating standards of justice or political legitimacy, we need not take certain facts about 
our non-ideal political or moral behavior in the real world into account. Estlund, for example, 
would say that the necessary and sufficient conditions for legitimate government are determined 
independently of the likelihood that the conditions will be met.1 Estlund, along with many political 
philosophers who share his view about the independence of standards of justice from “the facts,” 
are often called ideal theorists.2 Ideal theorists stand in opposition to non-ideal theorists, who argue 
that the principles and standards we formulate while doing political philosophy must be responsive 
to the imperfections of actual agents and their circumstances. The disagreement between ideal and 
non-ideal theorists captures some of what we mean when we accuse a theory of being “too 
idealistic” or “utopian”. 
In considering Estlund’s arguments, I will provide a brief overview of the literature 
surrounding the dispute between ideal and non-ideal theorists. Later, I will reject Estlund’s 
argument, providing my own qualified argument for non-ideal theory. I intend to show that when 
formulating our theories of justice, we ought to disregard some standards on the basis of the low 
chance that they will be met. Roughly, I will attempt to demonstrate that insofar as we are 
committed to the justified existence of a coercive state, we must be non-ideal theorists. 
I.  
 
1 Estlund, David. “What’s So Rickety? Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 71, no. 1 (2005): 208.  
2 Wiens, David, “Will the Real Principles of Justice Please Stand Up?” in Political Utopias, edited by Kevin Vallier 
and Michael Weber. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
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 A particularly interesting defense of ideal theory is given by Estlund in his piece, “What’s 
So Rickety? Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy.” At issue in “What’s So Rickety” is a 
particular objection to a standard of political legitimacy which appeals to the tendency of 
democratic processes to make well-informed decisions. The view that what legitimates democracy 
is its epistemic advantages is usually called “epistemic democracy.” The general idea behind such 
a view is that democratic governance is uniquely good at “outsourcing” decision-making to a large 
group of citizens, and that this strategy has epistemic advantages over other types of political 
organiztion. However, democracies have been notoriously criticized for their epistemic flaws. As 
far back as Plato, philosophers have maligned democracy for embodying the tyranny of the 
ignorant multitude, and many think there is little reason to suppose that democracies track the truth 
when it comes to policy decisions.3 But according to Estlund, even if it is unlikely that an epistemic 
standard for democratic legitimacy will be met, this improbability is not a legitimate objection to 
the theory per se.  
Estlund is responding to a particular argument given by Henry Richardson, but it appears 
that Richardson’s worry is shared by many political theorists, and Estlund observes that, “even if 
it is granted that there is an answer (to political questions), there is much skepticism about the 
ability of democratic processes to do very well at finding it.”4 If we are doubtful that democratic 
decision-making will produce the proper answers to difficult questions, it seems natural to think 
that an account which rests upon the ability of democracy to do just that is in hot water. Richardson 
also seems to have principled reasons to believe that the epistemic circumstances of real 
democratic polities are quite bad. Citizens are beset on all sides by demagoguery, political 
 
3Plato, Huntington Cairns 1904-1985, and Edith Hamilton 1867-1963. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including 
the Letters. 13th print., with corrections. Ed. Vol 71. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963, 488a-488e. 
4 Estlund, “What’s So Rickety? Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy,”204-205. 
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hucksterism, and intentional misinformation. In addition, there are powerful arguments that, given 
the high cost of informing oneself about the relevant political issues, combined with the relatively 
slim chance that one’s individual vote will play a difference-making role in a democratic decision, 
it seems plausible to claim that the most rational thing to do is to remain ignorant. Estlund admits 
that, “the idea that democratic institutions have a tendency to produce good decisions seems to fly 
in the face of what we know about the deficiencies of existing and likely democracies.”5 
 Estlund, perhaps surprisingly given his commitment to the epistemic value of democracy, 
grants that real democracies perform very poorly in these regards. However, he is not willing to 
admit that these flaws constitute flaws in the standard of legitimacy he has proposed. Estlund thinks 
that Richardson has not given an answer to the question that really matters; Richardson has shown 
that an epistemic standard would be demanding or “unrealistic”, but he has not shown an epistemic 
standard to be unreasonably demanding. Estlund writes, “a normative conception of democracy is 
free to hold people and institutions to certain standards even if they do not meet them.”6 Estlund 
thinks that this causes other problems for Richardson’s view, but the details of those arguments go 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
It seems the disagreement between Estlund and Richardson can easily be viewed as an 
instance of the debate between the idealist and the non-idealist, but Estlund makes some interesting 
comments in his response to Richardson that warrant a closer look. First, he clarifies that, “merely 
demanding more than what is actually the case is not always demanding too much.”7 This 
distinction is important to Estlund. One may plausibly object to a theory on the grounds that it is 
impossible to satisfy, but this is not the same thing as being currently unsatisfied, or even extremely 
 
5 Estlund, “What’s So Rickety: Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy,” 208. 
6 Estlund, “What’s So Rickety: Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy,” 208. 
7 Estlund, “What’s So Rickety: Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy,” 208. 
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difficult to satisfy. We must be careful, thinks Estlund, not to confuse impossible standards with 
standards that will almost certainly not be met. The former may give us good grounds to look 
elsewhere, but the latter do not pose a problem on the idealist’s view. Richardson, and other non-
ideal theorists who think that the epistemic standard demands too much, will have to sustain the 
harder claim that it is impossible to meet the epistemic standard. Estlund summarizes his view 
nicely by saying that, “My point is that if it is no deficiency in a standard that it is very unlikely to 
be met, then it is certainly no deficiency in a standard that it is less likely to be met than some other 
standard.”8 Putting Estlund’s claim in the context of democratic legitimacy, if non-epistemic 
democracy is more likely than epistemic democracy to give us the result that our governments are 
legitimate, this is not something that can count against an epistemic standard. 
Estlund makes similar claims elsewhere, notably comparing theorizing about justice and 
legitimacy to theorizing about morality. In “Epistemic Proceduralism”, he notes that “Moral 
philosophers know that people are likely to lie more than they morally should, but this doesn’t 
move many theorists to revise their views about when lying is wrong.”9 If the actual non-ideal 
moral behavior of the agents to which our theorizing applies makes it look like they will often be 
in violation of a standard prohibiting lying, we do not take this as a good reason to be more 
permissive towards intentional falsehood. If political theorizing is no different in kind from moral 
theorizing, then why should we be more  concerned with “realism” when making political claims 
than when we make moral claims? Again, Estlund writes, “it is hard to see. . . why political 
theorists would be in the grip of what we might call utopophobia -- the fear of normative standards 
for politics that are unlikely to be met.”10 This unjustified fear of unlikely standards has limited 
 
8 Estlund, “What’s So Rickety: Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy,” 209. 
9Estlund, David. “Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority”, In Does Truth Matter? Democracy and 
Public Space, edited by Ronald Tinnevelt and Raf Greenens. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, 21. 
10Estlund, “Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority,” 22. 
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our ability to fully conceptualize and productively revise our theories of justice, and Estlund clearly 
believes it is a fear we must shake off. 
Estlund’s arguments as they are presented in the preceding paragraphs are somewhat 
subtle, so we might do well to make them more explicit. First, he has acknowledged that if a 
standard  includes or entails impossible demands, it is an illegitimate standard.11 However, he was 
careful to distinguish between impossible and improbable demands. If a standard includes or 
entails improbable demands, then it is still possible that this standard is the correct one. 
Furthermore, it seems as though the epistemic standard for democracy resembles a standard which 
makes improbable demands, so objection on the grounds that it is unlikely that democratic polities 
will be epistemically well-equipped is no objection to the theory. What reason does Estlund give 
to believe this second claim? As we have just seen, Estlund points to examples of moral standards 
that would be improbably met, such as the prohibition on lying. In the case of moral theory, we do 
not take the likelihood a moral obligation or prohibition will be obeyed into account, so this 
likelihood should not count against normative political theories either. This claim relies on the 
further claim that normative political theorizing and moral theorizing are not different in kind, a 
claim which many non-ideal theorists will dispute.12 Taken together, these considerations (the 
distinction between impossible and improbable standards, the similarities between normative 
political theory and moral theory, and the myriad of moral standards that go, for the most part, 
unmet) it seems we are pointed in the direction of Estlund’s conclusion: The low chance that a 
normative political standard will be met cannot serve as a legitimate objection to that standard. 
II. 
 
11 Examples of this kind of standard would be a moral theory that requires one to do two things at once, or to be 
perfectly knowledgeable about future events. 
12 Valentini, Laura., “Utopophobia vs. Factophobia” in Political Utopias, edited by Kevin Vallier and Michael 
Weber. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
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Estlund’s argument looks convincing on first pass, but I think we have good reasons to 
think it is suspect. The main contention of Estlund’s response to Richardson is that we ought to 
treat improbable standards as different from impossible standards. We have reasons to avoid 
impossible standards, but no reason to avoid improbable standards. Since it looks improbable 
rather than impossible that we will meet Estlund’s epistemic requirements for political legitimacy, 
it seems to follow that we have no prima facie reason to avoid Estlund’s epistemic standard. 
Additionally, if it is no deficiency in a standard that it will likely go unmet, then it is no advantage 
in a standard that it is more likely to be met than alternatives.13 
Are any of these claims suspicious? It certainly seems right that an epistemically well-
equipped democratic polity is possible, and it is easy to see why Richardson’s objection to 
Estlund’s epistemic standard would be best characterized as a charge of implausibility rather than 
impossibility. Estlund also seems justified in claiming that a charge of impossibility is much harder 
to sustain than a charge of improbability, although granting him this point does not commit us to 
the view that improbability is unproblematic. Furthermore, it seems true that if we accept that 
improbability is unproblematic, and Richardson’s objection is that the standard will likely go 
unmet, we are committed to concluding that Richardson’s objections fall flat. It appears, then, that 
we will have to challenge the claim that the improbability of a standard is not itself a problem with 
that standard. One way to understand this claim, and the way Estlund presents it, is as 
distinguishing impossible and improbable demands. Call this premise the “utopic principle.” What 
argument does Estlund provide in support of the utopic principle?  
The utopic principle’s plausibility seems to depend, in large part, upon what we mean when 
we say that a standard of justice is impossible. It would be a mistake to confuse impossible 
 
13  Estlund, “What’s So Rickety? Richardson’s Non-Epistemic Democracy,” 209. 
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standards with those that are extremely unlikely, or even with standards that we know, in the strong 
sense, will not be met. We may have overwhelming justification for the belief that democracies 
will never be epistemically equipped in the way that Estlund prescribes, but this is not justification 
for the belief that it is impossible for democracies to meet an epistemic standard. He gives a nice 
example of this difference when he desribes how it would be possible to “dance like a chicken in 
front of your boss,” even though we plausibly have overwhelming justification for the belief that 
we will never do such a thing.14 Estlund does not spend much time in the metaphysical weeds 
cashing out just what it is for a standard to be impossible to meet, so we will assume that he uses 
the word in the way philosophers traditionally do.15 According to philosophical orthodoxy, 
something can be impossible in a number of ways. In the first place, a proposition can be logically 
impossible, which means that it is self-contradictory, or entails a contradiction. For instance, it is 
logically impossible that there exists a married bachelor, or a square circle. Alternatively, a 
proposition can be physically, or nomologically impossible, which means that it is impossible 
given the laws of nature. For instance, we might have reason to suppose that travel at speeds faster 
than the speed of light is impossible, not because it is logically contradictory, but because it is 
precluded by our best physical theories. These are coarse-grained accounts of impossibility, and 
metaphysicians would probably be inclined to revise them in various ways. Nonetheless, they seem 
sufficient for our purpose here. To put Estlund’s point in these slightly revised terms, we can say 
that a standard of justice is possible to the extent that it neither involves a contradiction nor is 
inconsistent with the physical laws of our universe. Roughly, Estlund is saying: suppose we grant 
that we can know that an epistemic standard will not be met. So What? This falls far short of 
 
14 Estlund, “Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority,” 22. 
15 There is good evidence that Estlund intends to use “impossible” this way. See Estlund, “Epistemic Proceduralism 
and Democratic Authority,” 22. 
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showing that it is impossible, and this latter task would need to be completed in order to provide a 
principled objection to epistemic democracy. 
Much of the support for the utopic principle seems to come from an argument from analogy 
that compares normative political theorizing to normative theorizing in general. We do not think 
that the imperfection of actual moral agents bears on the principles of morality, so why should we 
think the imperfections of actual political agents bear on the principles of justice? Estlund quite 
plainly claims that, “Thinkers about political philosophy are, for some reason, more concerned 
with ‘realism’ than are thinkers about moral philosophy in general.”16 There is a sense in which it 
is arbitrary to hold political theorists to a standard that moral theorists disregard. In order for 
Estlund’s argument from analogy to work, two things must be true.  
First, it must be the case that political theorizing and more general normative theorizing 
are similar. If the aims, norms, or use of normative political theory differ significantly from those 
of moral theory, then an analogy that compares the two is of dubious value to Estlund. Second, it 
must be true that moral theorists actually do ignore the probability that a moral requirement will 
be met. I want to be careful here to distinguish between claims about what the norms are and what 
they ought to be. Estlund is not just claiming that moral theorists ignore the improbability of the 
standards they set, but that they are justified in doing so. The more precise thought undergirding 
the analogy is that if moral philosophers are justified in ignoring the imperfect features of the 
world, then so are political theorists.  
I will say more about whether political and moral theory differ significantly in the next 
section when I develop my own view, so we will confine ourselves to an examination of the claim 
that moral theorists are justified in ignoring the imperfections of moral agents in the real world. I 
 
16 Estlund, “Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority,” 21. 
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am not confident that moral theorists themselves share Estlund’s view. Moral theories which set 
very high standards are often labeled as implausible. In fact, a common objection to act-
consequentialism is that it is too demanding. Since traditional act-consequentialist moral theory 
says that we must perform the act that maximizes the good among all possible actions, only one 
option in a given situation is permissible. The demandingness objection is motivated by the fact 
that this feature of act-consequentialism probably entails that we are almost always acting 
immorally, since it seems unlikely that any of our actions are optimal with respect to all their 
consequences. For example, the act-consequentialist position entails that if I do not make the 
choice of breakfast cereal that has the best consequences among all alternatives, I have acted 
wrongly. Another way to think of the objection is to compare two imaginary moral theories. The 
first moral theory says that among all actions that humans perform regularly, about 15% are 
morally permissible. Compare this to a second moral theory, which puts the percentage of 
permissible actions at around .001%. Part of what I take the demandingness objection to be saying 
is that there is something worrisome about the second number just because it is so low. There are 
a number of ways to express and respond to the demandingness objection, but it looks far from 
settled that morality really ought to be unconcerned with providing room for imperfection. Does 
this mirror Richardson’s objection to Estlund? 
It looks to me like we can construe the demandingness objection to act-consequentialism 
such that it very closely resembles Richardson’s objection to epistemic democracy. Both 
objections concern the chance a given agent (governmental or moral) has of complying with a 
standard. In both objections, the motivation seems to be that the proposed standard makes the 
agent’s chances of fulfilling some requirement problematically low. In the case of act-
consequentialism, we think that more of our actions are right or morally neutral than the theory 
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seems to entail. In the case of Estlund’s epistemic standard, we think less is required of a legitimate 
government than Estlund suggests. If this is the case, I think we have good reason to doubt that 
moral theorists are as unconcerned with the imperfections of actual agents as Estlund seems to 
think. We have seen that this claim must be true for the argument from analogy to work, so it looks 
like Estlund’s argument might face a problem. 
Of course, the observation that moral theorists sometimes do seem concerned with the 
actual imperfections of moral agents is not a knock-down objection to the argument Estlund gives 
in “What’s So Rickety.” Although his claim that moral theorists do not pay much mind to the 
failings of the objects of their theorizing seems false, it may still be plausibly replied that the 
demandingness objection to act-consequentialism is misguided. I am not prepared to grant that the 
demandingness objection fails, but it might be informative to turn to the other similarity between 
political and moral philosophy (similarity of purpose) which Estlund’s analogy needs to gain 
ground. In doing so, we will see there are significant dissimilarities that give us compelling reason 
to avoid overly-ideal ideal theory. 
 
III. 
In this section, I will switch from an evaluation of Estlund’s argument to the more difficult 
task of advancing an independent qualified argument for non-ideal theory. I intend for my 
argument to show that we must be able to discount standards on the grounds of their improbability 
if we wish to maintain that a coercive state is justified at all. As I mentioned earlier, the other 
condition for a good analogy between moral and political philosophy was the requirement that the 
two domains have similar aims. In other words, a comparison between the behavior of theorists in 
different domains is useful only insofar as the domains have similar goals, and the behavior 
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employed in the pursuit of those goals is of the same kind. A biologist does not defend his 
sloppiness by appealing to the carelessness literature professors show towards statistical method. 
To consider a more realistic example, a social scientist will not defend her unsubstantiated research 
by appealing to the professional standards of political philosophy. One domain seeks to investigate 
the empirical features of our political life, the other confines itself to the theoretical. The 
differences in methodology and the disparate goals of their investigation make an appeal to the 
other’s standards irrelevant. Do differences of this kind exist between political philosophy and 
more general moral theorizing? Are political philosophers and moral theorists trying to answer the 
same types of questions? 
 I believe there is a significant difference between moral and political philosophy. Insofar 
as political philosophy involves recommendations about how to organize governments, political 
theories will have to give convincing answers to certain questions that moral theorists may be 
justified in ignoring. In many respects, the constraints political and moral theories face are similar. 
A political or moral theory must be internally coherent, generally comport with our intuitions about 
right and wrong, and be mindful of the principle that ought implies can.17  But I hold that there is 
a deeper constraint, one unique to political philosophy, that precludes ideal theorizing. To 
understand this constraint, we will have to consider why political philosophers theorize in the first 
place. 
 The remarks made by political philosopher Robert Nozick at the start of his now-famous 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia are a good place to start. Nozick writes, “The fundamental question of 
political philosophy, one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is 
whether there should be any state at all. Why not have anarchy? Since anarchist theory, if tenable, 
 
17 Valentini, “Utopophobia vs. Factophobia,” 14. 
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undercuts the whole of political philosophy, it is appropriate to begin political philosophy with an 
examination of its major theoretical alternative.”18 Following Nozick, it seems a good political 
theory will be one that can give us a satisfactory answer to the question of why we ought to have 
a state in the first place: it must be capable of responding to the anarchist’s challenge.19  This is 
not to say that we should dismiss anarchy as a matter of methodology, or that we should begin 
political philosophy with the assumption it is false, nor should it be interpreted as the claim that 
anarchists are not “doing” political philosophy. Instead, what I am suggesting is that insofar as one 
is trying to come up with the necessary and sufficient conditions for a justified coercive state, it 
would be puzzling for one’s proposal to fail to answer the question of why such a state should exist 
at all. Idealization of the kind that Estlund employs in “What’s So Rickety” and elsewhere leave 
us ill-equipped to do just this.20  
To continue Estlund’s analogy with morality, it would be as if a substantive normative 
ethical theory turned out to have the result that no actions were morally required or prohibited. It 
seems that we would have good grounds to conclude that such a moral theory is fundamentally 
defective because it fails to do what normative ethical theories are supposed to do. Moreover, this 
rejection is not contingent upon the supposition that moral skepticism is obviously false: if moral 
skepticism were correct, we should not be constructing first-order theories of morality in the first 
place. In the same way that prohibiting or requiring at least some actions is a desideratum of moral 
theories, justifying at least some kind of state sounds like a plausible desideratum of theories of 
 
18 Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell, 2017, 4. 
19 More on this later. 
20 I recognize that political philosophers outside of the contemporary liberal tradition will object to this 
characterization. All I can offer in response to this objection is the observation that the debate among ideal and non-
ideal theorists appears to be conducted mostly within this tradition. 
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democratic legitimacy. If a theorist sets out trying to defend epistemic democracy and winds up 
with the conclusion that no state is justified, they have gone wrong somewhere. 
 To see why idealization endangers our ability to answer the question of when a state is 
justified, imagine that while theorizing about political philosophy, I stipulate that all potential 
citizens of my imaginary scenario are morally perfect. Whenever it is within their power and they 
have the relevant knowledge, my angelic citizens will do the right thing. Ideal theorists often 
appeal to something like this, construing it as the assumption that citizens will fully comply with 
any laws or government directives. My version of the full-compliance stipulation is stronger in 
order to illustrate its problems, but the basic idea is the same. 
How will this stipulation bear on the answer to the question of whether a state is justified 
at all? There is good reason to believe the only justified government for angels would be an 
extremely minimal one, and perhaps no state at all. To see why, consider the usual justifications 
for the existence of a state. Social contract theory is perhaps the most prominent attempt to answer 
the question of why a coercive state is justified. The general thought undergirding most social 
contract theory is that certain unattractive features of prepolitical life make submitting to the 
coercion of a state the most rational thing to do. Prepolitical life is unattractive due to the constant 
threat of violence and abuse at the hands of other people. Thomas Hobbes’ famous state of nature, 
the “war of all against all,'' can be understood as a conceptual tool to make these imperfections 
obvious. In Leviathan he writes, “in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. 
First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.”21  The tendency of prepolitical agents to 
 
21 Hobbes, Thomas. “Leviathan.” In Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts, 1st ed., 3:309–44. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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become violent and seize the property of others is, in Hobbes’ view, what makes political 
organization and submission to coercion appealing.22 
Since all of these justifications are based on the imperfect behavior of other human beings, 
the stipulation of angelic behavior on our part should make them irrelevant. If my idealized, 
angelic, agents always do the right thing, then we have no reason to need a central authority to 
compel them to respect their compatriot’s rights; they will do so naturally. This result, however, 
is deeply counter-intuitive. In fact, structuring society with the assumption that no one will ever 
do any wrong seems like a recipe for disaster. Surely, we want to respond by saying that the 
stipulation that everyone does the right thing all the time is less reasonable than the stipulation that 
voters are well informed. Maybe so, but Estlund’s arguments seem to make this response 
impossible. Recall that Estlund carefully distinguished between improbable and impossible 
standards. According to him, we have reason to avoid impossible standards, but no prima facie 
reason to avoid improbable ones. The problem is that the stipulation that our society is made up of 
angels is clearly merely improbable. The chances everyone will actually do the right thing all the 
time are astronomically slim, but Estlund has already argued that slim chances are not reasons to 
doubt a standard per se. It looks like we must accept that the proper state is none at all, perhaps 
barring cases in which certain kinds of coordination by a neutral third party is necessary.  
I want to make two things clear about this consequence of Estlund’s view. First, this is not 
a result that Estlund himself will accept. We should keep in mind that Estlund’s argument in 
“What’s So Rickety” was meant as a defense of the legitimacy of a democratic state. The puzzling 
 
22 It might be argued that Hobbes thought moral rights only existed after the foundation of a commonwealth, so it is 
inaccurate to say that he was pointing to a moral flaw in humans in the state of nature. This may be right, but what is 
unambiguous in Hobbes’ work is his belief that the state of nature is very bad for all involved, and that this is the 
motivation for the formation of the state. My idealized agents would just not act in the way that causes life before 
the state to be “nasty, brutish, and short.” 
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result of our idealization was that no state is needed, so unless there is some independent reason 
to reject our idealization that citizens are morally perfect, we have shown that ideal theory 
undermines Estlund’s own theory of legitimacy. Of course, it is still open to the ideal theorists to 
give a reason independent from likelihood that the idealization is improper, but we have seen that 
improbability, by Estlund’s own lights, is not available as an objection. Second, the conclusions 
we should draw from this argument go beyond Estlund’s epistemic democracy and tell us 
something valuable about political philosophy in general. A satisfying theory of a legitimate state 
must take into account at least some imperfections in the human being about which it theorizes, 
otherwise political philosophy cannot get off the ground.23 Failing to account for the imperfect 
behavior of citizens will preclude any democratic theory at all, since we will just arrive at the 
conclusion that a coercive state’s very existence is unwarranted. 
To sum up the argument thus far: the same arguments that Estlund has used to defeat 
objections to his idealization concerning epistemic behavior can be used to justify the conclusion 
that no state ought to exist in the first place. We can conclude from this that certain kinds of 
idealization endanger the entire project of political philosophy insofar as it calls into question the 
justification for any state at all. To lose sight of our flaws is to lose sight of the fundamental goal 
of political philosophy: the justification of the existence of the state, whatever that state may look 
like. Insofar as we are committed to the position that anything other than an extremely minimal 
state is justified, we must reject Estlund’s argument that the likelihood of a standard being met is 
not an objection to the standard. I will now move to considering several objections to my view. 
 
23 I am here following Nozick’s thinking that “Anarchist theory, if tenable, undercuts the whole subject of political 
philosophy.” The motivating idea here is that political philosophy concerns which relations of citizens to state are 
justified, and that this whole project is undermined if we begin with the assumption that no relations of the kind 
political philosophy seeks to justify are, in fact, justified. This problem seems analogous to normative moral 
theorizing insofar as we must believe there are at least some moral truths in order to do normative ethics. 
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First, the most obvious objection to the argument as it stands is to point out that I have 
given a reason not to idealize about the moral behavior of political agents. It may yet be possible 
that we are justified in idealizing about the epistemic qualities of citizens in our hypothetical polity. 
Such a response is misguided. Notice that my strategy was to show that the argument Estlund 
provides in “What’s So Rickety” has consequences he would not accept. I pointed out that the 
stipulation that all citizens were morally perfect met all of the criteria provided by Estlund for a 
reasonable standard. A successful objection to my view cannot simply point out that I have proven 
a different standard implausible, it must acknowledge either that we may discount certain 
idealizations on the basis of their likelihood, or that there is some reason independent of probability 
to reject the citizen-angel stipulation.24 Moreover, I should note in response to this objection, I am 
not, in principle, opposed to some level of idealization; what I am opposed to is Estlund’s defense 
of his idealization. My argument simply shows we must allow improbability of some level to count 
against a standard if we want to do any political philosophy at all. 
A second objection might be to say that once we have opened the door to rejecting a 
standard on the basis of improbability, we allow counterintuitive consequences in the other 
direction. If we allow standard A’s higher likelihood to make it more appealing than standard B, 
won’t we just be letting people off with worse behavior? Estlund makes a point like this in “What’s 
So Rickety” when he is comparing moral philosophy to political philosophy. Won’t our admittance 
that a sufficiently unlikely standard is prima facie unappealing commit us to unsavory moral 
conclusions? It is extremely unlikely that human beings will forgo murdering one another. Is this 
reason to think that a standard prohibiting murder is too demanding? First, we might respond by 
 
24 One account of an independent reason not to stipulate perfect moral behavior might depend upon certain species 
of moral anti-realist views. If there is no fact of the matter regarding what it is right to do, then we cannot stipulate 
that everyone will do the right thing. Estlund will certainly not accept this reason, nor will most political 
philosophers committed to justifying the state. 
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denying that the fact that some standard A’s higher likelihood is a reason to prefer it to standard 
B. This seems wrong in cases where both standards are relatively likely. The fact that a standard 
is very slightly more likely should not provide us with even a pro-tanto reason to adopt it. Instead, 
what we should say is that there is some level of demandingness that makes a standard implausible. 
Precisely what this level should be is a difficult question, and one which I cannot possibly settle 
here. But this proposal does seem to deal with some of the more egregious consequences of the 
view that improbable standards should be discounted: for example, it may prevent the principle 
from entailing that a moral injunction requiring that one never kill for no reason is less plausible 
than one that requires us to refrain from killing for no reason only some of the time. But beyond 
this response, I think there is another available to the non-ideal theorist. The claim of Estlund’s I 
have been disputing is his assertion that it is no objection to a standard of justice that it is unlikely. 
If we reject this claim, we are still free to think that it is only some objection to a standard, and 
often not a decisive one, that it is unlikely. In the case of murder, it seems like even if it is highly 
improbable that a moral standard prohibiting murder, the extreme moral badness of murder would 
outweigh even an incredibly slim chance that the standard will be satisfied. In the case of Estlund’s 
epistemic standard, I do not mean to settle the question of whether it is, on balance, justified. I 
mean only to show that it should at least count against the standard that it is very improbable. 
These two replies together seem to increase the plausibility of a rejection of the utopic principle. 
Finally, I will consider an objection related to a possible justification of the state that I 
mentioned earlier. In some cases, it seems that problems of coordination may justify the state’s 
existence. Perfectly morally compliant citizens may still need to be organized in certain ways to 
avoid negative externalities and solve collective action problems. I am prepared to grant this point, 
but it does not do much to help the ideal theorist. Whatever the coordination the state partakes in 
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for its ideal citizens, the interference and coercion involved will be minimal. In the case of “tragedy 
of the commons” style scenarios, we could imagine that the state’s role would be merely to assign 
property rights, and nothing more. Since we have idealized enough to guarantee the perfect moral 
behavior of citizens, we can rest assured that they will all perfectly comply with the distribution 
of property rights the state chooses in order to solve the problem. A state that exists solely for the 
purposes of coordination will not be sufficient to justify the kind of democratic state Estlund has 
in mind. Only the staunchest of libertarians would be satisfied with a state organized purely to 
coordinate morally perfect citizens. 
 
IV. 
 What I have tried to argue in this paper is that if we wish to theorize about which kinds of 
states are justified, we must accept that some standards are too improbable to be correct. This 
conclusion stemmed from the observation that one of the foundational assumptions of political 
philosophy is that a state is needed to prevent citizens from harming and wronging one another. 
Idealization of the kind Estlund and ideal theorists use to defend improbable assumptions about 
human behavior can preclude giving an answer to this fundamental challenge of political 
philosophy that most liberal political theorists will accept. Despite what I see as progress, many 
questions surrounding ideal and non-ideal theory remain. How much, if any, idealization is 
permissible when theorizing about justice? How could a standard for permissible idealization be 
set? Which other aspects of political philosophy and moral philosophy are analogous, and what do 
these analogous features tell us about the nature and purpose of these branches of philosophical 
investigation? Whatever the answers to these questions might be, it seems a step in the right 
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direction to acknowledge that human beings are flawed, and that our answers to the most complex 
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